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CAN LAWYERS STAY IN THE DRIVER’S SEAT?
Daniel Currell and M. Todd Henderson*
The law firm business is thriving, despite significant pain in the legal sector as changes take place. The
continuing success of Big Law is in part because of its
ability to adjust quickly to changes in demand by hiring
and firing staff. But as Larry Ribstein saw, big changes
nevertheless loom on the horizon. These changes will
likely be driven by a series of specialized service providers who compete with law firms from a lower price
point as Benjamin Barton points out in his article in this
volume. If history is a guide, cheaper alternatives will
evolve into higher-quality alternatives, at which point
the law firms most invested in the status quo are likely
to suffer greatly. While the significance of this disruption is often viewed in terms of how it will affect lawyers, in fact it should be assessed mainly from the perspective of consumers and society: does the quality of
legal services rise or fall at any given price point?
While this is the correct question from a social
standpoint, a related question of immediate interest to
lawyers is this: will lawyers still be “in the driver’s
seat” of the legal sector when the dust settles? Or will
they cede their leadership in the way that architects
ceded leadership in the construction sector? Architects
were once clearly at the top of the food chain in the
building sector, but that is no longer the case. Developers and general contractors have a great deal more
power and, it must be said, make far more money. Will
traditional law firms cede control of major legal projects
in the same way?
This is a radical question – but we believe it is not
frivolous. Lawyers don’t generally have sophisticated
* Executive Director, Legal, Risk & Compliance Practice, CEB,
Inc.; Professor of Law and Aaron Director Teaching Scholar, University of Chicago Law School, respectively.
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procurement, project management and commercial
skills. These skills are important for managing complex
legal matters, and there is a large and growing class of
non-traditional legal service providers who are cultivating those skills. It could turn out to be more efficient for
traditional law firms to focus on what they do best,
which is far less than the work of managing every aspect of a legal matter – just as the work of an architect
is much less than managing an entire building project.
Architects supply a key intellectual input to a building
project. By the same token, law firms could end up
supplying a key intellectual input to a legal matter.
As Bill Henderson points out in his article in this
volume, there are cultural and practical barriers to law
firms – as currently structured – changing their model to
adapt to the market. At a minimum, the traditional law
firm model faces stiff competition in the decades to
come. More radically, law firms may find themselves
sidelined from some of the most important aspects of
legal representations.
Yet if law firms cede their traditional leadership
role, effects on their clients and society will not necessarily be positive overall. Because of this, we believe it
is important to consider the implications of these changes on the education, licensing, and regulation of lawyers. The traditional law firm’s ability to avoid the fate
of other commoditized professionals will depend in part
on how lawyers approach the content of their education,
the design of their licensure system, and the regulation
of their industry.
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“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age
of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief,
it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was
the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before
us, we were all going direct to heaven, we were all going direct the
other way . . ..”1

I. INTRODUCTION
If you read the papers or any number of legal articles from the past few years, you’d think lawyers are
in crisis. (Note, we didn’t say “clients” or “society”; this
is an important point to which we will return.) Larry
Ribstein, whom we’ve come to honor in the way he
would want, by taking him on, wrote three or four papers, plus a book on the subject.2 His scholarship is
just a fraction of the ink spilled in the past few years on
the issues of the business model of law firms, legal education, and licensing. The economics of the legal profession has become a cottage industry among law professors, as has the coverage of law schools and failing
law firms. The media has jumped on the bandwagon
too. There was, for instance, enormous coverage of the
recent failure of the law firm Dewey & LeBoeuf, one of
the country’s most respected firms.3 The New York
Times also ran several large, marquee stories on legal
education, including a rather negative piece on the New
York Law School.4
But is this really an existential moment for the
legal profession? In an interview with the New York
Times on the Dewey collapse, lawyer Michael Trotter,
1

Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities.
See, Larry E. Ribstein, “The Death of Big Law,” 2010 WISC. L. REV. 749 (2010); Larry E.
Ribstein, “Practicing Theory: Legal Education for the Twenty-First Century,” 96 IOWA L. REV. 1649
(2011); Larry E. Ribstein, “Lawyers As Lawmakers,” 69 MO. L. REV. 299 (2004); LARRY RIBSTEIN &
ERIN O’HARA, THE LAW MARKET (2009).
3
For just a small sample, see, e.g., “Standoff Continues Between Dewey Retirees, Bankruptcy
Estate”, The American Lawyer, Oct. 11, 2012; “Dewey Defied Law of the Jungle”, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 14th 2012; “Dewey Partner Plan: A New Remedy for Law Firm Bankruptcies?”, Wall Street
Journal blog, Oct. 15th, 2012.
4
See, “An Existential Crisis for Law Schools”, The New York Times, July 24 th, 2012.
2
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who has written two books on the legal profession,
makes the case that the profession is doomed:
There are now far more capable lawyers
and law firms than there is work for them
to do. The financial costs of legal services
have gotten so high that most clients are
determined to reduce them. Many legal
services have become commodities that
can be supplied by a large number of
firms with sufficient quality to meet the
needs of most clients in most situations,
and corporate general counsel now know
that they can get what they need at a lower cost if they force the major firms to
compete for the work.5
When asked whether he’d recommend his grandchildren to become lawyers, his answer was a categorical
“no.” This was based on his view that the chance of
making it to the top of the industry is low, and adding,
“much of the work that’s done [to try to get there] is not
challenging or interesting work.”6
Ribstein’s work is also pessimistic at its core. In
the piece most relevant to our short essay, The Death of
Big Law, he applied economic insights to the current
law-firm business model, and found it untenable in the
face of various fundamental market pressures. These
included the move away from partnerships and toward
limited liability, globalization, and the growing role for
in-house counsel. Looking past the short-term problems big law firms were experiencing during the Financial Crisis, he persuasively set out a vision for law firm
work as involving greater investment in innovation, deploying new technologies, and offering new services
5

http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/dewey-leboeuf-crisis-mirrors-the-legal-industrys-

woes/
6

Id.
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under different organizational structures. The world
Ribstein imagines is one in which the current law firm
crisis forces legal professionals to play new roles, and
then he describes how deregulation of the legal industry, in areas such as partnerships with non-lawyers,
financing arrangements, and licensing, may be needed
to achieve this end.
In this essay, we come at the issue from a slightly
different point of view. We make several arguments.
First, we provide some data suggesting the crisis is
much less acute than it seems. Law as a business is
thriving, despite the seeming seismic shifts going on
beneath the surface. While there are problems looming
on the horizon, and undoubtedly there have been lawyers and recent law graduates who have had their expectations dashed, it has never been more lucrative to
be a big firm lawyer. This is in part because law firms
have been especially nimble in the face of market pressure. The transition costs – hiring and firing – are very
low, and therefore law firms can respond to less demand with higher rates. This bodes ill for competitors
hoping to kill off big law.
Second, insofar as there is a crisis, it is one for
those vested in the status quo rather than future lawyers, clients, or society. Innovation and change come to
all industries, and what society generally cares about is
the customer, not the producer. While industry insiders
may have an interest in protecting this or that model of
the profession, it isn’t at all obvious that society should
care one way or the other. That is – unless the changes
make the quality of law worse. The only thing clients
(and therefore society) care about is delivery of quality
legal services at the right cost. The changes going on in
the industry have not yet pushed the cost curve down
as far as it seems may be possible, and we do not know
the impact from the variety of changes yet on the quality of law. Given the difficulty of measuring the latter,
there is great uncertainty about doing a social cost-

DRAFT JANUARY 16, 2013

4

CURRELL & HENDERSON

benefit analysis. We have yet to see any persuasive argument that any given change in law costs or law firm
models will make society better or worse off, but instead see just a lot of talk about how interest group X
or Y will be impacted. This is not a very interesting
conversation.
Third, there are, notwithstanding these first two
points, profound changes to the legal market as it unbundles into discrete segments of products and services markets. The main forces driving this are technology and the transparency and ease of collaboration that
technology facilitates.
Naturally, the technology itself creates new challenges – most obviously, there is now vastly more documentation (including potentially millions of emails)
implicated in any given transaction or dispute. But the
other side of that coin is technology’s ability to facilitate
– and, increasingly, to perform – the ordering and analysis of that documentation. All of that work used to be
done in the vertically integrated law firm. Now we see
the potential disintegration of what has to date been
the vertically integrated law firm model.
But firms exist for a reason, as Ronald Coase
taught us. They lower information costs; they reduce
the cost of collaboration.7 For an integrated firm structure to naturally come apart, collaboration between
firms needs to get easier. Given the complexity of the
data sets and information involved in legal work, this is
no small matter. But collaborative technologies appear
to be in their intermediate stages – the move to “web
2.0” gives us a glimpse of what is possible. If the unnamed masses can crowdsource the world’s largest
(and possibly most accurate) encyclopedia, it seems
likely that an ecosystem of five or ten unrelated firms
could crowdsource a complex transactional representation.
7
Coase, Ronald, "The Nature of the Firm", Economica (Blackwell Publishing) 4 (16): 386–405
(1937).
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Building an ecosystem of this kind can only happen, however, if there is a fair bit of transparency into
the marketplace, and visibility into the work being performed within the ecosystem of firms. Technology has
advanced the state of this visibility – even simple developments like LinkedIn and other social networks provide vastly better information about who the players are
within any industry, how their work is structured, and
what they might be good for. It’s easier to build a team
when you can evaluate all of the players.
As to visibility into work being performed – this is
hard to do even in a traditional law firm. Which lawyers are pushing a project along? Which are shirking?
It’s easier to know if they work just down the hallway;
harder to know if they are in the Los Angeles office and
you are in New York. But new technologies allow contributors to see the progress of their collaborators in
real time, following work as it progresses and constantly re-assessing next steps.
With the advent of these collaborative technologies, a firm structure could become irrelevant. Would
two Wikipedia authors create better work from adjacent
offices? Some legal services firms have made great progress in this area, stitching together very effective global teams within and across firm boundaries.8 This ability – if it continues – could allow “virtual firms” to succeed by connecting professionals with very different
skills to work on common projects. Like any collaborative enterprise, rules of engagement would be important, but durable commitments to the other players
might not be.
Fourth, in light of this long-term change in industry structure, the crucial question facing the legal
industry is whether lawyers will still be in the driver’s
seat when it comes to directing the course of complex
client representations. For years, lawyers have not only
8
Perhaps the best example – though surely not the only one – comes from a firm called
NovusLaw. See http://www.novuslaw.com/Process-NovusC3.aspx.
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been in the driver’s seat; they have in fact performed
and been paid for nearly all the services. Now, lawyers
are a sort of prime contractor sitting atop a system of
service providers who work at their direction. But it
wouldn’t have to be this way, particularly as the relative economic power of the different players shifts. To
be specific, it could turn out that the parties earning
the most in a representation become the most powerful
players in crafting its strategy, and that those parties
are not lawyers in the traditional sense.
If this suggestion sounds awfully unlikely, think
of the architect’s role in the production of a skyscraper.
To be sure, architects and engineers occupy a respected position in the network of people and firms that
make a skyscraper happen. But they earn nowhere
near the majority of the money being paid out, nor do
they control most of the resources involved. They are
not in the driver’s seat.
It wouldn’t necessarily have to be this way. One
can easily imagine a world in which the architect sits
atop every project, calling the shots on how his vision is
to be executed. Because this didn’t happen, architects’
services have been commoditized and, to be frank, they
don’t make much money in the scheme of things. The
real money flows through and to the general contractor
and the developer.
The question for lawyers is whether they should
stay in the driver’s seat, managing representations
where fulfillment is run through many different parties,
or if they will increasingly become a commoditized subcontractor of specialty services like most architects.
Lawyers surely occupy a strong position today and
could stay in the driver’s seat on even the most complicated representations. But to do the work effectively,
lawyers will need to develop procurement, project management and other skills not native to their planet.
Finally, we discuss briefly the implication of the
lawyer as prime contractor on the education, licensing,
and regulation of lawyers. The ability of lawyers to
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avoid the fate of other commoditized professionals is
dependent on how lawyers approach the content of
their education, the design of their licensure system,
and the regulation of their industry. For society, what
matters is an appreciation that ultimately this is irrelevant, unless a case can be made that the outcome
meaningfully changes the quality or quantity of law at
any given cost. It is important when considering the
changes, however, to note that the people making the
rules that will influence where lawyering is headed are
lawyers, and therefore may not have the broader social
interest in mind when writing the new regulations.
II. THE RESILIENCE OF BIG LAW
Most of the recent analysis of the changes impacting the legal sector is based on a perception that
law firms are in trouble. In The Death of Big Law, Ribstein admirably tries to look past the recent Financial
Crisis and its impact on law firm hiring to deeper
trends in the industry, but he nevertheless uses the
collapse of firms like Coudert Brothers and Brobeck,
Phleger & Harrison to illustrate the fragility of the industry.9 Ribstein identifies seven factors he believes
threaten the survival of the traditional law firm model:
(1) “the rise of in-house counsel”; (2) “reduced size and
scale advantage”; (3) “increasing partner-associate ratios”; (4) “changing clientele”; (5) “limited liability”; (6)
“increasing global competition”; and (7) “deprofessionalization of law practice.”10 While we agree that these factors (and more) are all relevant to the future of the legal
sector, it is not at all clear from the data that law firms
are in the immediate danger that Ribstein suggests.
Notwithstanding the fact that there was a recent
downturn in hiring of law school graduates and many
firms have closed or laid off lawyers, in many ways,
9

Ribstein, Death of Big Law, supra note 2 at 771-773.
Id at 760-770.

10
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these are the best times ever to be a big firm lawyer. To
be sure, it looks possible the legal sector is about to go
through some very serious and painful changes. But
the data do not support a claim that the recession has
been particularly hard on lawyers. The most honest
starting point for any analysis of the future of the legal
profession is a recognition that law firms are doing
very, very well and have been for the past decade.
It is commonplace to say that the current law
firm model is unsustainable. But this just begs the
question: unsustainable for whom? The big law model
in widespread use today has been sustained for decades, and remains capable of producing millions of dollars in profits per partner even during economic hard
times. The profits produced in the last decade exceed
those that would have been hoped for in the 1990’s,
another prosperous time for lawyers. For instance, Figure 111 shows that the prices for services from big law
outpaced other producer prices, white and blue collar
wages, and GDP growth over the past decade, including
during two significant recessions.

11
All data is drawn from the 2012 Real Rate Report, a collaboration of CEB and TyMetrix. The
law firm rate data is drawn from a database of several billion dollars of legal fees actually paid to law
firms, and is not a reflection of the law firms’ claimed rates or “rack rates”, which are discounted for
most clients. The report’s full analysis is reserved for a group of private clients, but for an overview
of
the
report,
see:
http://www.executiveboard.com/exbd/legal-risk-compliance/real-ratereport/index.page.
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Figure 1: Selected US Price Indices
All price indices indexed to their 2001 level = 100

Ultimately, pricing is determined by supply and demand – particularly in a transparent market like this
one – and supply and demand have been very kind to
law firm owners lately, despite the major disruptions
and changes in the rest of the economy.
There is no doubt that many participants in the
legal sector have suffered significant pain. As Ribstein
notes, many firms have failed. In addition, many recent
graduates had difficulty finding jobs, especially at the
height of the Financial Crisis. True, many law firm
owners have become former law firm owners – downsized, forced out, or otherwise removed. But, not to be
flip, that’s business. In every other industry, Schumpeterian “creative destruction” is commonplace, and a
sector’s success or failure is usually assessed by how it
performs for its customers and its owners. As Figure 1
above suggestions, big law firm owners have done awfully well for themselves in the last decade or so. Law
firms are very successful businesses, and they have
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remained so through the recession. The data below in
Figure 2 show this more clearly:
Figure 2 - Lawyers’ Average Rates Through the Recession and
Recovery

Lawyers’ rates continued to climb while other economic
indicators were very weak.
Although rates have increased, it is true that clients have bought less of their services. In 2009, companies reduced the amount they paid to law firms for
the first time in a decade or more, as shown in Figure
3:
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Figure 3 – Survey of 110 In-House Lawyers
“Compared to 2008, our spending on outside counsel in 2009 . . .”

But nevertheless, by quickly adjusting the supply of
hours, law firms continued to grow their rates and in
many cases increase their profits per partner and overall earnings. Revenue per lawyer shrank among AmLaw 100 firms only in 2008 and 2009, growing again in
2010 and 2011. By laying off lawyers and staff and
otherwise controlling costs, most firms were able to
stay very profitable in 2008 and 2009, and some firms
had record earnings in those years.
Since then, the top 100 American firms have
been growing and profitable – as measured by revenue
per lawyer, profits per partner, salaries, and now even
by headcount.12 Law firms are growing again even as
employment measures across the economy remain
stagnant.
In this way, law firms are enviable businesses (at
least for the owners), since they have the ability to
shrink supply very quickly in response to reductions in
demand. They can do this by laying off lawyers and
staff – and frankly, they can shrink supply by working
less and charging the same or more per hour for constrained output. In this way, the sticky wage problem
or the sticky supply problem that plagues many busi12
“The AmLaw 100 2011”, The American Lawyer, May 1 st 2011, available online at
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202550268433.
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nesses may be easier for law firms to handle. Either
way, supply and demand still explains what’s going on,
and so far the story hardly suggests an existential crisis for big law.
But the increasing demand for legal services has
not been distributed as equally across firms as we have
seen in the past. As shown on Figure 4 below, the billing rates for top performing lawyers have grown at
dramatically faster rates than for lower performing lawyers. This could simply be a version of what economists
call the “superstar effect.”13 If the costs of purchasing
the best of a particular product or service fall over time,
then consumers have less incentive to purchase the
second best. One way in which costs for superstars
may fall is if information technology or other changes in
the cost of production make it easier for superstars to
offer their services across a larger asset base. For instance, as the costs of listening to opera singers falls
over time (starting with concerts-only, then limited access to records, and now to immediate online access to
any singer), then the superstar effect predicts greater
and greater returns to the top opera singers, and lower
returns to their competitors.

13

Rosen, S. 1981. “The Economics of Superstars.” American Economic Review, 71(5): 845-

858.
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Figure 4 – Higher-Billing Versus Lower-Billing Lawyers

This is not necessarily a bad thing from a social
welfare perspective. After all, we care about welfare
gains to customers, as well as any welfare losses, as
best we can calculate them, to lawyers who are less
than superstars. We cannot know the optimal tradeoff
here, and therefore it is difficult to condemn the trend
shown in Figure 4. What society cares about is the
quality of law at a particular price. And from just this
data we cannot make definitive conclusions. It could be
that the gains to customers from superstar lawyers
outweigh the transition costs for the non-superstar
lawyers. Or perhaps the structural changes to costs
means that better lawyers (or even new legal services)
will be more broadly available at lower cost than they
would have been without a powerful superstar effect.
Critics, including Ribstein, believe the large firm
model is doomed in part because the glue that holds
partners together is weakening. Ribstein notes that the
move to limited liability organizations means that partners have a lower incentive to monitor their colleagues.
In addition, technology reduces switching costs for lawyers, and the superstars may use their power to leverage greater rents from competing firms.
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The model for driving profitability in recent years
has been to bring as many lawyers as possible onto a
steady, big and elite platform of services, and to tie
their billing rates to the overall rate scheme, as Bill
Henderson’s article in this volume discusses. In this
sense, the economic rationale for big law is to act as a
mechanism for tying the services of non-elite lawyers to
those of elite lawyers, increasing the profit power of the
elites. In other words, hourly pricing rarely reflects the
value of the person billing out his or her time; it reflects
the market’s willingness to pay for the overall bundle of
hours offered by the team working on any given matter.
This is easiest to see in city-to-city transfers of
young associates. A fourth-year Big Law associate who
moves from Madison to Washington, D.C. may as much
as double her billing rate – but the move did not make
her a better lawyer. Her rate doubles because her services are now tied to the services of more scarce and
sought-after professionals with a distinctive knowledge
set. If she moves back to Madison in two years, having
gained two years of knowledge and experience in Washington, her billing rate is still going to be slashed by
50% or more. Her rate is not about her; it’s about the
people she is bundled with.
By the same token, the most sought-after partners are generally underpriced. In-house counsel will
essentially admit this by noting how difficult it is to get
their time – and that, when you can get their full attention, $1100 an hour is more than worth it. But as clients regularly experience, partner prices are essentially
teaser rates that pull clients in, only for work to be performed by other partners and associates who bill at
rates elevated by their association with the marquee
partner. The fact is, that partner is not really available
for very many hours to any given client; even at $1100
an hour, the market has more than cleared.
This leads to the inference that partners’ “natural” rate – what they would charge if they were truly solo practitioners with no ability to bundle their services –
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is probably much higher than the $1000 or so we see
in America right now. This inference is supported by
the one example that occurs in nature where truly elite
lawyers must earn money exclusively from the sweat of
their own brow: UK barristers. Because barristers are
not allowed to affiliate with other lawyers in the way
American lawyers do, they truly make their money only
by billing their own time. Top barristers in London
were billing at £1,000 ten years ago; current rates are
higher. Having said that, top barristers don’t appear to
ultimately make as much money as many American big
law partners – the pyramid model still delivers more
profit.
Of course, it doesn’t matter if the firm is a pyramid, a tower, or an hourglass. Where pricing is bundled, prices are only sensible when seen in the context
of the bundle of tied services. Professionals that nobody has ever heard of (and may never meet) are tied to
the services of superstar lawyers, and the effect is to
raise the rates of every lawyer in their orbit. This way,
the whole firm becomes more profitable and even the
associates can be paid well. Some evidence for this
model, which any lawyer understands intuitively as the
current market model for big law, is presented in Figure 5 below.
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Figure 5 – Average Hourly Rates by Law Firm Size, 2009 2011

Although Ribstein and others may be correct that
there will be an increasing number of big law firm
flameouts, to this point the evidence is just anecdotal.
At least for now, as Figure 5 shows, big firms continued
to have more pricing power than small firms even in the
wake of the financial crisis. And prices are very definitely still going up.
We do not want to sound blasé or overly optimistic, but the current law firm model, despite some recent
evidence of weakness, seems to be thriving. Like any
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system, it is not indefinitely sustainable, because forces
beyond the power of any individual lawyers will cause
change. The reason we are all writing about this now is
that there are good reasons to believe that the forces
arrayed against the large law firm model are starting to
act visibly in the sector. One small leading indicator –
the ability of law firms to bill their least skilled people
as part of the “platform” of services – appears to be declining, as shown on Figure 6:
Figure 6 – Entry-Level Associate Hours Billed as a Percentage
of Total Lawyer Hours Billed per Client

So while firms kept and even extended some aspects
of their pricing power, they have lost some of their ability to force the full pricing structure onto clients. Put
another way, clients are forcing firms to disaggregate
their services and sell them more a la carte than in the
past. Clients still pay a premium for what they purchase, but they no longer have to buy everything from
one firm; they are unbundling the legal services suite.
As we discuss in the next part, we are seeing more
experimentation with alternatives to the billable hour,
legal process outsourcing, and other alternatives to the
traditional model. All of this is facilitated by the ability
to unbundle legal services. Even so, Big Law remains
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economically healthy; the death of big law that Ribstein
proclaimed may happen, but for now its vital signs are
strong.
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III. THE FUTURE LEGAL SECTOR
Ribstein (and others) chart a fairly radical future
for law firms and the legal sector. Before we offer our
particular point of view on the future, we pause to note
that the evidence suggests the change is more likely to
be evolution rather than revolution. For instance, there
are many startup firms offering legal process outsourcing (LPO), but in-house legal departments are adopting
these services at an extremely slow rate. Perhaps this is
because law is inherently a conservative field, but
whatever the reason, companies (that is, clients) have
been very slow to move. While legal process outsourcing has existed for well over a decade now – specialist
e-discovery firms, contract administrators, and more –
it is still true that even among public companies with
in-house legal staff, uptake on these services is quite
limited. It is still frankly easier to turn to a law firm for
one-stop shopping, and the law firm incentive, at least
so far, is to keep the work largely in-house. This is illustrated below in Figure 7.
Figure 7 – Percentage of In-House Departments That Have Ever Used Legal Process Outsourcing Providers for At Least One
Task, 2012
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As this illustrates, over half of the 89 corporate
counsel surveyed in early 2012 indicated that they had
never used any LPO for any reason. Our experience
suggests that these are probably the smaller departments in the response group – they simply don’t want
to incur the coordination and oversight costs of managing a network of providers.
So, the potential savings are significant, but uptake of LPO services is limited. Fewer than 10% of
counsel in this survey suggest that their companies
“regularly” used an LPO for discovery tasks, even
though discovery often accounts for the lion’s share of
legal fees in much American litigation. This response
group was limited only to companies with at least 200
pieces of litigation ongoing during 2011 – so the LPO
option was a real one, and in most cases it wasn’t taken. One-stop shopping (hire a law firm, let them handle it) is still very attractive.
Ribstein’s point that companies may grow their
legal departments to insource some legal work and pull
it away from law firms is right in principle – the numbers suggest that companies could save substantial
money that way. But companies don’t tend to. CFOs
prefer to keep headcount low even if it means spending
more on outside vendors like law firms.
The data in Figure 7 are a reflection of this: companies could make better use of LPOs, move towards
unbundling the law firm service, and save money overall if they had more in-house staff. In other words, inhouse staff don’t just facilitate doing more work inside
the company; they facilitate doing work outside the
company much more efficiently by ensuring that the
best provider is doing the work, and that won’t always
be a law firm.
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But companies don’t often staff this way, even
though the potential savings are clear. Firms these
days like to stick to their competencies, and those
competencies rarely include the management of law
firms and LPOs. They prefer to let someone else do the
driving, and to date, this has always been law firms.
As LPOs grow in size and capability, law firms won’t
necessarily be doing the driving forever.
Perhaps the slowness of even large clients in regularly using LPO services is just a version of Amara’s
Law: We tend to overestimate the effect of a technology
in the short run and underestimate the effect in the
long run. In other words, Ribstein’s prediction of the
death of big law is perhaps a decade too soon, but it
could also be too modest if we project further forward.
Whether technology will have the same impact on law
that it has on other fields remains an open question,
especially since lawyers are largely responsible for making the laws and rules that determine the fate of their
industry. While perhaps futile in the long run, this
power might forestall change for longer than possible in
other industries. Law may therefore conform to Amara’s
Law, but with a slightly different shape of change over
time than the internal combustion engine or speech
synthesis.
With these preliminaries said, where do we expect the legal sector to move, sooner or later? We offer
three relatively preliminary and somewhat ordinary observations.
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The first big change we see coming is that products and services will continue their century-old migration away from one another – that is, a legal product
(information) will be more easily separable from a legal
service, such as analysis of a factual situation. Analysis
will even become a product in some cases. This kind of
disaggregation has happened in countless other industries. New companies (and in response, incumbent
ones) have used technology, such as information technology, computers, organizational innovation, and process design, to disrupt prevailing methods of doing
business by offering completely new suites of products
and services. For example, Google took an activity as
old as society—sifting through information, organizing
it, prioritizing, and storing it—and turned it into a
product. The new product – “search” enabled by a new
technology, called a “search engine” – quickly became a
commodity, although one that Google could profit from
because of its enormous volume and the fact that it
was slightly better than the next best alternative.
Google is the superstar of search, and it uses its global
reach to achieve enormous volumes of use, thus ensuring profit at even low margins.
Just as Google “productized” what would previously have been a service, some legal services are becoming commoditized and productized. The review of
documents, the management of cases, the research of a
legal issue, the design and application of basic legal
documents, and other simple lawyer tasks are all now
discrete industries in which many new startups are offering technology-based solutions to clients. These services were once bundled into the law firm platform –
but now it remains to be seen if they stay bundled.
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There are arguments for it remaining so, as a descriptive matter. Chief among these are the regulatory
barriers Ribstein describes in The Death of Big Law.
The current rules banning law firms from having nonlawyer partners, coupled with professional licensure
and rules banning the unlawful practice of “law,” defined very broadly, are significant impediments to innovation in the legal sector. Since lawyers preferring the
status quo currently outnumber lawyers trying to upset
it, and the latter is also not a more powerful interest
group (yet), there is reason to believe these rules will
persist for a while.
The key to changing the political calculation is to
make the case that the lawyers (and others) opposing
the status quo arrangements regarding lawyers are interested in improving the quality of law or the price of
law for a given quality. The argument can be a tough
one to make. Increasing access to lawyers, which lowering prices would presumably do, is not clearly a good
thing. For it to be so, one would have to believe that
lawyers and legal processes add social value beyond
their social cost, which is not at all obvious. For instance, if one believes that litigation effectively and efficiently deters accidents, say by improving product design or disclosure about products, but that the optimal
point of deterrence has not yet been reached, then lowering legal costs might work a social welfare improvement. But, on the other hand, if one believes the marginal benefit of lawyers is zero (because we are at the
efficient point) or negative (because lawyers serve their
own interests or impose costs that exceed the benefits),
then lowering legal costs would be a bad thing.
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There are numerous areas of law beyond litigation, however, and in these the case may be easier to
make. In most transactions, lawyers serve the role of
trying to increase the size of the total pie (or “surplus,”
as economists would say), as well as helping to divide it
in the interests of their clients. It is in this transactional world where technological improvements can be of
most obvious value, and therefore for regulatory barriers to be most sensibly removed. For instance, if everyone would be better off if everyone made wills, then
lowering the costs of will making (at a given quality)
would be a social improvement.
Or take a more complex example: mergers and
acquisitions. Many academics and corporate observers
believe the quality of corporate management (and therefore the quality of corporations) depends heavily on the
discipline provided by a robust takeover market, what
is called “the market for corporate control.” Let managers know that they could be ousted after a takeover,
and they will behave. A significant cost for any merger
is the due diligence and approval process, which involves the review (by lawyers and others) of thousands
of documents for both content and privilege. This process was once done by hand (with armies of contract
lawyers) but is now increasingly done by technology. As
the costs of diligence and approval fall, and undoubtedly new legal technologies can make them fall dramatically, then this lowers the total costs (that is, the sum
of decision costs and error costs) of takeovers. This
means more deals can be done at a given price, which
increases the disciplining power of the market for corporate control.
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On the other side, however, is the fact that all
mergers today result in multiple lawsuits designed to
frustrate their completion or get the best deal for
shareholders, depending on one’s point of view. Given
this ambiguity, and the fact that cost reductions may
make litigation cheaper as well, the net effect on social
welfare may be zero or even negative. If more deals can
get done but more lawsuits that simply transfer wealth
to lawyers or impose costs on defendants are possible,
then the benefits may be canceled out. Since the technology may work equally well for both transactions and
litigation, the result is uncertain. Of course, if the quality of outcomes can be improved or law works faster (for
a given quality of outcome), then the technology may be
a social benefit. But these are large open questions that
may be determined by one’s prior beliefs about the value of lawyers in the first place. As such, it is hard to
definitively see how the political calculation for reform
plays out.
The second big change we see happening is that
process efficiency will, as in so many industries, be the
most sustainable competitive advantage for new legal
technologies/firms. Cost arbitrage (locating in North
Dakota or Gurgaon) can easily be replicated; new technology can be quickly shared or copied. But process
advances are often extremely difficult to replicate, even
when the code is known. Consider Wal-mart. The efficiency gains from the Wal-mart operations and logistics
process accounted for an enormous amount of the total
US productivity gain of the 1990s and 2000s. Few
companies have been able to come close to matching
Walmart’s efficiency, even though they have tried to deploy similar process changes.
Another classic example involves the “lean” manufacturing process deployed by Toyota. Lean manufacturing is an organizational, informational, and manufacturing process that is relatively simple. For instance,
individual workers on an assembly line are empowered
to make suggestions for work improvements, often us-
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ing notes placed in cubbyholes, or to innovate on their
own initiative. Toyota and other Japanese auto manufacturers deployed these processes during the 1980s to
gain enormous improvements in quality. Their “secrets”
were set forth in great detail in the 1991 book The Machine that Changed the World,14 and yet American auto
makers were unable to replicate the results. It seems a
firm cannot just decide to “go lean” on a complex process.
Legal representation (particularly for large matters) is a complex process, and it is far from likely that
lawyers working within traditional law firms have the
wherewithal to transform their operations – to “go
lean.” This opens the door for specialty firms who have
deep competencies in a single process and its related
technologies. A good example is NovusLaw, which specializes in document management, to develop process
improvements outside of law firms as a separate service. NovusLaw has created processes and developed
technologies and quality control programs to lower the
costs of document review, management and analysis
services. This type of specialization in process is something that law firms are unlikely to be good at – it is exceptionally hard to stretch a firm into a new industry,
which is essentially what this shift in focus would do.
Instead, we expect to see firms that are good at reforming complex processes to beat up law firms in this
space extensively. Indeed, NovusLaw and many other
LPOs were founded by non-lawyers with prior experience in business process outsourcing.
The third big change we see happening is that
some entity will serve as a “prime contractor” for selection, coordination, management, and liability for these
new technologies. The prime contractor is in the driver’s seat - making choices about resource allocation,
and sitting atop the economic food chain.
14
The Machine that Changed the World: The Story of Lean Production, James P. Womack,
Daniel T. Jones & Daniel Roos (1991).
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In some fields, it seems as if the original professional has been able to serve in this new role. Medicine
may be an example of this. Over the past few decades,
a variety of new market participants have entered the
medical area to offer new products and services. The
rise of the nurse practitioner, the physician’s assistant,
massage therapists, physical and occupational therapists, nutritionists, MRI providers and a host of other
medical technologists is a good example of this phenomenon. So too may be the development of new technologies that do the things that doctors used to do. But
the doctor is generally still the primary gatekeeper between patients and these service providers or technologies. Based on licensure or reputation or perceived expertise, doctors have been able to capture much of the
value of these new services. Doctors (or maybe hospitals) are (still, it seems) the quarterbacks of the medical
sector: they call the plays. Unlike prime contractors,
they may not profit directly from the services provided
within the broader network of providers. But their position at the top of the network ensures that they will
continue to do very well.
On the other hand, as noted above, architects
seem to have ceded this central role to others. Other
professionals, like developers and contractors, were
able to take over the prime contractor role that could
have been served by architects. The same might be said
about big box or catalog retailers, like Sears. New entrants, like Amazon, deployed new technologies and
processes, all of which were easily replicable in some
sense, to overtake incumbents who held all the natural
advantages in brand, customer loyalty, information
networks, and so on. To be sure, Sears and K-Mart
were just firms and not professions with the ability to
use licensing to secure their advantage, but it remains
to be seen how powerful this difference is. It did not
seem to have worked for architects, although perhaps it
has for doctors so far.
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The result of all this is a market characterized by
a series of providers that are coordinated by a prime
contractor. The question for the legal industry is: who
will the prime contractor be? Will law firms be able to
play a significant role in the deployment of these new
technologies or will they be marginalized? This is the
question we take on in the next part. But it is important to reiterate that the question for customers, the
economy, and the nation is: will the result serve us
well? Whether lawyers are able to maintain their privileged position is utterly irrelevant from an efficiency or
social welfare point of view.
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IV. CAN LAWYERS STAY IN THE DRIVER’S SEAT?
So far we’ve argued that the market for legal services is surprisingly stable even in the face of big
changes. We’ve also noted that big law firms are surprisingly robust in the midst of what seems to be a rapidly changing market. We’ve argued that the biggest
likely change for lawyers is in the process of law, specifically the management of documents, as well as the
commoditization of routine legal analysis and services.
These developments are all part of the unbundling of
the legal services suite. If the market fragments in this
way, major representations will involve the services of
multiple specialty providers instead of being housed in
a single law firm. Among those many firms, who will be
in the driver’s seat?
There are several possibilities, which we only
sketch briefly here. Clients could still go to a single law
firm, which would then coordinate all of the activities of
various service providers, whether they provide document review technology, legal research, analysis, or another function. One could say that this is the current
default – clients go to a law firm, and the firm coordinates other service providers to the extent there are
any. Historically this has at least included photocopying, court reporters, and other relatively low valueadded services. In the last decade this has evolved to
include things like legal research, document analysis
and management, and other higher value-added work.
But law firms still have little incentive to outsource
those services under the prevailing model, meaning
that LPOs are still used fairly infrequently.
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Businesses with large or sophisticated in-house
legal departments could coordinate their own legal matters – stitching together a network of LPOs, law firms
and individual lawyers to serve their needs. This already happens in some cases, but it’s still quite rare.
With the exception of major financial services, pharmaceutical, energy and defense companies, in-house departments are very thinly staffed. Most in-house counsel spend very little of their time managing law firms,
yet they know that this is a very important task that
too often gets ignored.
As the legal market wakes up, gaps are starting
to be filled by entrepreneurs. On the matter of helping
corporate counsel to find and manage law firms, a recent example is a small company called AdvanceLaw.15
AdvanceLaw helps companies that already have large
legal departments to find and retain lawyers in mid-tier
cities (e.g., Minneapolis or Sacramento) who can do the
work of a Chicago or Los Angeles law firm more efficiently.
What’s remarkable is that this service is needed
at all. Does the general counsel of a Fortune 500 company really need help finding counsel in Minneapolis
just so she can do the obvious thing and send her securities work there at half the cost of a Chicago firm?
Because of high search costs, the difficulty and cost of
oversight, and frankly the fact that in-house counsel
are spread thinly across dozens of different activities,
the answer is yes. This is an important observation,
because it runs contrary to the general assumption in
the legal market that clients will select and manage
their own law firms – as though that were a fairly simple task.

15

See www.advancelaw.com.
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Put another way, management really is work, and
it’s hard work. The tasks of identification, selection,
quality control and oversight of firms – those tasks are
difficult and time consuming. And the proof is in the
pudding: for many years, they have been hard enough
to deter even relatively sophisticated clients from attempting to switch from their incumbent law firms to a
new provider. The switching costs are high. Firms like
AdvanceLaw exist to carry the burden of selection and
oversight, and they are making good money to date because there is demand to shift work away from incumbent law firms in major cities towards smaller, cheaper
firms in mid-sized markets.
We are hesitant to draw any firm or long-term
conclusions at this point, but we offer some perspectives informed by our interactions with the various participants in the market.
It is very unlikely that, at least in the medium
term, the prime contractor for legal services will be the
client. In-house legal departments have not been built
this way or shown the wherewithal to run legal matters
in detail. Although seemingly very well positioned to
serve as coordinator, in-house departments are currently more like Sears than they are Amazon. Their
principal competency is inward-facing: they know their
company better than any outside lawyer ever could, but
they are weaker in facing outward to the market. LPOs
have existed for more than a decade, and it is exceedingly rare for an in-house staff to coordinate external
providers in a meaningful way.16

16

To anticipate an objection: yes, there are rare instances of large in-house departments actively
managing a slew of vendors. These examples are well-known because of the massive size and reputation of the departments involved – e.g., DuPont (in fact, see: www.dupontlegalmodel.com). But if
there are about 5,000 companies listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ, perhaps 20-30 companies do
something like this, and the rest do nothing of the sort. A more accurate picture of the market is this:
most public companies do not have a single in-house lawyer. Of those who do, most have one or two
lawyers total. A few hundred at the top of the market have a “legal department”. Needless to say,
most private companies have no in-house counsel at all.
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In any event, there will never be a surfeit of inhouse counsel. General counsel usually want more
staff, and CFOs are allergic to headcount. The disagreement reliably ends there – in-house lawyers are
added very slowly and only after needs arise.
While new firms may be formed to coordinate law
firms and other legal service providers, they face significant barriers. For starters, because of profit sharing
rules in the legal sector, firms like AdvanceLaw are extremely limited in what they can do and how they can
get paid.
Beyond this, issues about expertise, confidentiality, and privilege will discourage the formation of these
firms, as will the reluctance on the part of clients to
add another cost layer, even if the net result seems to
be an overall cost reduction on paper. For one reason,
another layer means additional monitoring and other
agency costs, which are likely to be quite significant for
start-up firms trying to build a reputation for quality
work. In addition, law firms, who would in this model
serve an important subsidiary function – e.g., legal
analysis – will likely resist sharing their client relationships with other providers for fear of poaching.
So from an expertise, trust, and regulatory (profit-sharing) perspective, law firms may be able to stay in
the driver’s seat here. In fact, they occupy a protected
space. They can sit at the center of the growing field of
specialist non-lawyers, and instructing them in their
work, preserve the attorney-client privilege while
providing the most value-added (and expensive, noncommoditized) pieces of work.
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But there is a significant problem with this prediction. Law firms, as currently constituted, are terrible
at management, coordination, project planning and execution, technology management and integration, and
pretty much everything involved in stitching together
the efforts of a diverse and unrelated collection of vendors to create a coherent service for clients. As anyone
knows who has been through the experience, it is wellnigh impossible to take a services firm and turn it into
a software firm – or to go the other way. Companies
naturally develop around a set of competencies, and
getting a firm to adapt to a new competency is hard.
Adapting a firm to a whole new industry is nearly impossible without making that shift through acquisitions.
Law firms could choose to acquire LPOs and tuck
them into the firm’s service offerings. Profit sharing
rules might make it hard for them to attract and retain
the best talent in this part of the firm, though some
creative entity structures could likely get around those
concerns. But the fact remains that lawyers would
need to develop a robust project management competency, and this is just not a part of the culture of big
law.
In short, law firms are well positioned to serve as
the prime contractor, but they aren’t well positioned to
be any good at it. If this is to change, then there are
several aspects of legal education, legal licensure, and
law firm management that will have to change as well.
We consider these issues briefly in the next part.
V. FROM HERE TO THERE
The big problem with law firms serving as the
prime contractor for a suite of legal services is that the
kind of activities involved in managing a suite of specialist vendors are not a part of law firm culture, and
appear nowhere in lawyers’ training. Law schools are
currently designed to teach individuals to learn law, to
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apply law to facts, and to offer advice in light of this legal analysis. Lawyers, at least at the law school the authors attended, are not taught to manage suppliers of
legal technology. The comparative advantage of lawyers
is the one they have as officers of the court, that is,
knowing the law and applying the law to situations,
business or otherwise. For the same reasons architects
don’t sit atop a dizzying roster of suppliers to manage
everything to do with the construction of their buildings, lawyers may do poorly to sit atop a dizzying array
of vendors to coordinate the execution of their legal
strategies. There are important differences between
these two examples, but the basic concern about lack
of competency, inappropriate use of time and talents,
and comparative advantage stands.
Of course, law schools could change. The next
generation of lawyers could be taught these skills, and
there have been some minor nods in this direction. Alternatively, there could effectively be two tracks within
law schools, or perhaps within firms: those interested
in “management” and those interested in “analysis.”
This is done in many fields, including in academia,
where some scholars focus entirely on ideas and scholarship, while others get involved in “administration.”
The FBI uses this approach as well. All special agents
work cases for the first several years, but then some
are selected to become managers. This involves additional training to develop these management skills.
From these analogs, one can imagine either law school
providing a grounding in these skills for those interested in a future career in legal management, or firms
providing them (as in the case of the FBI), or perhaps a
supplementary education provided by law schools or
business schools or some other schools for lawyers interested in legal management. (Here, the model could
be something like the current executive MBA programs,
which teach business people management skills at the
mid-point of their careers.)
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In any event, the traditional pyramidal structure
of law firms (that is, a relatively small number of partners supported by a larger number of associates) may
start to look more like a tower. As the data above in
Figure 6 suggest, there is already pressure on the pyramid model, and the law firm as prime contractor
would decrease further the viability of this model. This
will require law firms to rethink their business model,
but it isn’t clear what the impact will be on profits.
While partners traditionally made money by taking labor profit from their associates, they may be able to
achieve the same result by marking up their subcontractors’ services. In competitive equilibrium, it isn’t
clear that this will be a less profitable model.
The larger implication for law firms will be about
how they develop and select partners. The current
model of hiring a hundred associates, filtering them
through many years, and then selecting ten partners
from that group may be unsustainable in a world in
which a law firm serves the role of prime contractor
and engages in only more specialized legal analysis.
One option would be to rely on the subcontractors to
hire lawyers to serve support functions, and then
choose from that pool. But the skills needed in these
two areas are likely to be vastly different, making this a
very unlikely option. Moreover, if technology is disruptive, the total number of lawyers necessary will fall,
perhaps dramatically. (This is a big problem for the
current model of legal education, which may produce
too many lawyers, especially those who aspire to do the
high-end analysis work that is likely to remain the domain of traditional lawyers.)
Another option for law firms is to simply be
choosier about the associates they hire. This will not
only impact law schools by reducing the demand for
lawyers, but will also put pressure on the law school
curriculum, on the evaluation law schools do of their
students, and perhaps increase the need for specialty
licensure.
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On the latter point, some work has been done,
including by Ribstein, on the issue of specialty licensure. It is, after all, somewhat odd that lawyers are
subject to a licensing regime (the bar exam) that is
completely different from that in other professions like
doctors and stock brokers. For instance, the bar exam
is a one-time test (usually taken at the end of law
school); it is a general subject matter test taken by every lawyer; and it has extremely high pass rates. In contrast, in medicine, licensure examinations take place
over time (including while in various stages of education and training), must be repeated with some frequency in re-accreditation exams, and, in addition to a
general test, are tailored for specific specialty subject
matters. Neurosurgeons and pediatric oncologists both
take the multi-stage medical boards to become “doctors,” but take separate boards, including every few
years, to certify their competence in the particular
fields. Stockbrokers utilize a similar, if somewhat less
rigorous, approach to licensure.
Another version of this is the Canadian model of
“articling,” in which a law graduate spends about a
year as an apprentice with an approved mentor learning about the law. This would not have to be as much a
return to the 18th Century model of legal education as it
may sound. If law firms are going to face pressure on
their current business model, everything that happens
before law firms take on new associates, whether it is
law school, extra-law school education, apprenticing,
licensing, and so forth, will likely become much more
important. In light of this, it is natural to see law firm
partners starting to push law schools into doing more
practical skills training and filtering of students.
Whether law schools have a comparative advantage
here either vis-à-vis law firms or third party providers
remains to be seen, but expect the pressure to intensify
as changes wrought by technology increasingly makes
the law firm pyramid more unsustainable.
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We imagine that the move toward a prime contractor role for large law firms, as well as a new model
in which legal work is allocated not to a single or select
group of large law firms but rather a more nimble mix
of providers, will put pressure on law schools and the
ABA to adapt the licensure model. For example, law
firms may demand ex ante certification of legal analysts
in particular areas, like securities, mergers & acquisitions, bankruptcy, or complex civil litigation, instead of
using the first few years of law practice as a learning
tool and filter for associates. If firms become more towers than pyramids, they may try to have others, mainly
law schools and bar programs, do some of the ex ante
filtering and teaching for them.
In addition, the need for specialty licensure may
be a sort of keep that is the last defense of the lawyer
bastion. Getting specialty credentials, whether it is a
license or a certification, may be a way for these lawyers to forestall competitive pressures on legal analysis.
Such pressure may even explain the development of the
alternative models used by doctors and stockbrokers.
Whether these pressures push back to impact law
school curricula or increase opportunities for third parties, like BarBri or the Princeton Review, to offer law
content is beyond our scope here. But one suggestion
seems likely to us: if the legal profession continues to
play the troll guarding the only bridge to the practice of
law, the market will figure out how to build other, unprotected bridges. After all, the “practice of law” is a
pretty narrow concept, and a great deal of legal service
can be rendered without resorting to it. If the current
regime doesn’t change, it could emerge that lawyers
have a shrinking piece of a growing overall pie.
And the pie will continue to grow. There is simply
no reason to believe that overall expenditures on law
will shrink in the foreseeable future. But while we believe the sector will grow, we are far less confident in
our ability to predict how exactly that growth will take
place, and how clients will be served under the new
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model. The evolution has begun, albeit slowly; it will
definitely continue.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this essay, we’ve tried to make a few simple
points. First, as the epigraph above suggests, times are
not often easy to pigeonhole, and are, in any event, different things to different people. Along many measurable dimensions, these are the best of times for large law
firms. The returns to owners of large law firms have
never been better, despite the country suffering
through the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. This should point to the durability of the existing large law firm model, either because of its social
value or because of the ability of lawyers, as rule writers, to rig the game to their favor. The durability is especially remarkable because, unlike during prior periods of macro-economic distress, law firms are facing
incredible pressure from various entrants offering to
unbundle the typical law firm product, by offering legal
products, like document review and management, as
well as legal services, like simple contract preparation.
This should give pause to those who believe, like our
dearly departed friend Larry Ribstein, that Big Law is
dead.
Second, and notwithstanding the first point,
there is abundant evidence that past is not prologue.
The technological forces that are reshaping industries
and creating new products and services, as well as unbundling existing providers of products and services,
are as powerful in law as they are in the entertainment
business, consumer goods business, securities business, and so on. Ribstein rightly predicted a sea change
for big law, albeit perhaps falling victim to Amara’s
Law.
Third, we imagine the net result of this change
will be the creation of a new role, what we call the
“prime contractor,” that involves two key features: (1)
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carving out some protected space in which lawyers exercise their comparative advantage as legal counselors;
and (2) profiting from the remainder of legal work by
acting as a case facilitator/manager. The second role
could involve choosing and monitoring suppliers, entering into joint ventures or partnerships, providing tailored value added services on top of basic technological
platforms, or even vertical integration. While we are
certain we cannot predict what the future will look like,
we are confident large law firms are going to want to
play some role here.
These leads to our fourth point, which is that to
do so, the model for training and licensing/certifying
lawyers is likely going to have to change, but not perhaps in the way that the current critics suggest. Rather
than teaching lawyers how to think more like their clients, it might be as or more important to teach lawyers
to be better managers of other suppliers of legal products. Lawyers will also inevitably be involved in the development of new technologies and legal tools, and
there may be educational green space here as well. Our
(very preliminary) guess is that firms will try to push
much education and filtering out of the firm, but they
will obviously do so only if they are saving money by
doing so. If they “pay” for this one way or the other,
then it may make sense to keep it in house. But if they
can externalize the role the pyramid used to play onto
others, for example, a government that subsidizes education, then this should be what we expect them to do
more of.
Finally, all of this speculation is in a sense beside
the point from a social welfare standpoint. A benevolent
social planner shouldn’t give a hoot whether law is delivered this way or that, whether law firms serve as the
prime contractor or even if there is one, or whether law
schools teach things that matter or not. What matters
to society are the quality, quantity, and price of legal
services. These things are in turn determined by the
rules put in place that regulate lawyers, as well as the
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choices made by institutions like law schools, bar associations, and law firms. What is crucial to realize is that
these institutions will have their own selfish incentives
in mind when crafting rules, and these may deviate
from the social optimum. It is far from obvious that Adam Smith’s confidence about butchers and bakers obtains in a world in which lawyers have successfully
used a cartel to restrict output and raise prices for
hundreds of years. That said, we are not confident at
this point about how the social welfare calculus cuts.
In some sense, lower costs of law could be a good thing,
while in other sense it could be a bad thing. As the future of Big Law and every other kind of law unfolds, if
our essay conveys nothing else, we hope it conveys that
the social question should be paramount – not the
smaller matter of whether lawyers win or lose in the
coming industry reshuffle.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor M. Todd Henderson
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
toddh@uchicago.edu
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